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ABSTRACT 
 
Pinning Down the Value of Statistical Life*
 
Our research addresses fundamental long-standing concerns in the compensating wage 
differentials literature and its public policy implications: the econometric properties of 
estimates of the value of statistical life (VSL) and the wide range of such estimates from 
about $0.5 million to about $21 million. We address most of the prominent econometric 
issues by applying panel data, a new and more accurate fatality risk measure, and 
systematic selection of panel estimator in our research. Controlling for measurement error, 
endogeneity, individual heterogeneity, and state dependence yields both a reasonable 
average level and narrow range for the estimated value of a statistical life of about $5.5–$7.5 
million. 
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1. Introduction 
The value of statistical life (VSL) concept based on econometric estimates of wage-
fatality risk tradeoffs in the labor market is well established in the economics literature. 
The method provides the yardstick that the U.S. Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) requires agencies to use in valuing fatality risks reduced by regulatory programs.1 
More recently, VSL estimates have also provided the basis for assessing the mortality 
costs of the Iraq war (Wallsten and Kosec 2005, Bilmes and Stiglitz 2006). 
Notwithstanding the wide use of the VSL approach, there is still concern over excessively 
large/small estimates and wide range of the estimates for VSL. One approach to the 
dispersion of VSL estimates that has been used by the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency has been to rely on meta analyses of the labor market VSL literature. Our 
research demonstrates how using the best available data and econometric practices pins 
down the estimated VSL to a greater degree of refinement than in previous studies.  
Our paper works within the econometrically familiar framework of the hedonic 
wage equation used in the value of statistical life literature. For worker i (i = 1,…,N) in 
industry j (j = 1,…,J) and occupation k (k = 1,…,K) at time t (t = 1,…,T) the hedonic 
tradeoff between the wage and risk of fatality is  
 0 1ln ijkt i jkt ijkt t ijktw X uα α π β δ= + + + + , (1) 
where ln wijkt is the natural log of the hourly wage rate, and πjkt is the industry and 
occupation specific fatality rate; Xijkt is a vector containing dummy variables for the 
worker’s one-digit occupation (and industry in some specifications), region of residence, 
plus the usual demographic variables: worker education, age, race, marital status, and 
                                                 
1 See U.S. Office of Management and Budget Circular A-4, Regulatory Analysis (Sept. 17, 2003). 
Available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a004/a-4.pdf. 
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union status. Finally, tδ  is a vector of time effects, and uijkt is an error term allowing an 
individual-specific effect plus conditional heteroskedasticity and within industry by 
occupation autocorrelation.2  Our research will subsequently expand the structure 
summarized by equation (1) in a variety of ways, many of which will exploit the 
capabilities of panel data by using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics in conjunction 
with fatality risk measures that vary by year. 
The apparent instability of the labor market VSL estimates has generated a series 
of prominent econometric controversies reviewed by Viscusi and Aldy (2003). The 
underlying hedonic model for equation  (1) is that it traces out the locus of labor market 
equilibria involving the offer curves of firms and the supply curves of workers. Many of 
the most salient concerns involve the fatality risk variable, which ideally should serve as 
a measure of the risk beliefs of workers and firms for the particular job. Broadly defined 
risk measures, such as those pertinent to one’s industry or general occupation, may 
involve substantial measurement error. There have been concerns regarding the potential 
endogeneity of the job risk measure as well as state dependence. Equation (1) may also 
omit important characteristics of the job or the worker, leading to omitted variables bias. 
Here we will exploit the capabilities of a very refined risk measure defined over time and 
by occupation and industry, coupled with panel data on workers’ labor market decisions, 
                                                 
2 The econometric structure in (1) is different than Brown’s (1980) panel data model where the job risk 
variable was the same in all years and was given by the 1967 Society of Actuaries data, which provided 
information on overall mortality risks for people in 37 relatively high risk occupational groups and 
produced a VSL of only about $1.9 million. Moreover, the time variation in risk in his model arose from 
changes in occupation over time. In contrast, our research uses a highly refined fatality risk measure for 
720 industry-occupation cells for which there is variation across time as well as variation that arises as 
workers change either their occupation or industry. Finally, we adopt a parametric specification of the 
regression model representing hedonic equilibrium in (1) for comparison purposes with the existing 
literature. An important emerging line of research is how more econometrically free-form representations 
of hedonic labor markets facilitates identification of  underlying fundamentals, which would further 
generalize estimates of VSL (Ekeland, Heckman, and Nesheim 2004). 
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to resolve many of the most prominent issues in the hedonic labor market literature. Our 
focus is on the average VSL across a broad sample of workers and will consequently not 
explore emerging concerns regarding the heterogeneity of VSL by age and other personal 
characteristics. 
 We devote particular attention to the measurement error issue emphasized by 
Black and Kniesner (2003) and Ashenfelter (2006). While we do not have information on 
subjective risk beliefs, we will use very detailed data on objective risk measures. 
Published industry risk beliefs are strongly correlated with subjective risk values3 and we 
will follow the standard practice of matching to workers in the sample an objective risk 
measure. Where we differ from most previous studies is the pertinence of the risk data to 
the worker’s particular job, and ours is the first study to account for the variation of the 
more pertinent risk level within the context of a panel data study. 
We address the pivotal issue of measurement error in several ways. The fatality 
risk variable is not by industry or occupation alone, as is the norm in almost all previous 
studies, but is a refined measure based on 720 industry-occupation cells. We use not only 
one-year but also three-year averages to reduce the influence of random year-to-year 
fluctuations.4 Because the fatality rate data are available by year, workers in our panel 
who do not change jobs can have a different fatality risk in different years. In contrast, 
the only previous panel-based labor market VSL study used the same occupational risk 
measure for 37 narrowly defined high risk occupations for all years, so that all possible 
variation in risk was restricted to job changers (Brown 1980). Our research also explores 
                                                 
3  See Viscusi and Aldy (2003) for a review. 
4 The only previous use of the fatality rate data at our level of disaggregation and for different periods of 
time is in Viscusi (2004). Kniesner, Viscusi, and Ziliak (2006) also used the 720 cell measure but not the 
multi-year averages. 
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using adjacent year first differences as well as long differences, for which the influence 
of measurement error should be less pronounced. We also examine how instrumental 
variable estimates for each approach attenuates measurement error and endogeneity bias. 
Finally, our dynamic first-difference estimates make it possible to include longer-run 
worker adaptations to changes in their job risk level that may occur if they are not 
perfectly informed about the risk initially. 
Many studies have noted that potential biases in VSL estimates arise due to 
possible omitted variables, such unmodeled worker productivity and safety-related 
productivity.5 We infer the role of omitted variables through a variety of estimation 
approaches, most of which exploit the capabilities of our large panel data set. Fixed effect 
models sweep out the individual effects for both the adjacent year differences and the 
long differences. In each instance, we use the pertinent instrumental variables estimator, 
following Griliches and Hausman (1986). Our work also distinguishes job movers from 
job stayers. We find that most of the variation in risk and most of the evidence of positive 
VSLs stems from people changing jobs across occupations or industries possibly 
endogenously rather than from variation in risk levels over time in a given job setting. 
Our econometric refinements using panel data have a substantial effect on the 
estimated VSL levels. They reduce the estimated VSL by more than 75 percent from the 
implausibly large cross-section PSID-based VSLs of $18–$21 million. We demonstrate 
how careful econometric practice narrows the estimated value of a statistical life from 
                                                 
5 Hwang, Reed, and Hubbard (1992) hypothesize that unobserved worker productivity biases VSL estimates 
downwards. Viscusi and Hersch (2001) examine safety-related productivity, but do not offer any 
directional hypothesis regarding the induced bias. Shogren and Stamland (2002) theorize that unobservable 
worker skill in promoting safety leads VSL estimates to be too high, but their result stems from analysis of 
infra-marginal workers who will not be captured in market evidence. 
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about $0.5–$21 million (Viscusi and Aldy 2003) to only about $5.5–$7.5 million, which 
greatly clarifies the choice of the proper VSL to be used in policy evaluations. 
2. Panel Data Econometric Framework 
 Standard panel-data estimators permitting latent worker-specific heterogeneity 
through person-specific intercepts in (1) are the deviation from time-mean (within) 
estimator and the time-difference (first-differences) estimator. The fixed effects include 
all person-specific time-invariant differences in tastes and all aspects of productivity, 
which may be correlated with the regressors in X. The two estimators yield identical 
results when there are two time periods and when the number of periods converges 
towards infinity. With a finite number of periods (T > 2), estimates from the two different 
fixed-effects estimators can diverge due to possible non-stationarity in wages, 
measurement error, or model misspecification (Wooldridge 2002). Because wages from 
longitudinal data on individuals have been shown to be non-stationary in other contexts 
(MaCurdy 1982; Abowd and Card 1989), we adopt the preferred first-difference model as 
a baseline. 
 The first-difference model eliminates any time-invariant effect by estimating the 
changes over time in hedonic equilibrium 
   1ln ijkt jkt ijkt t ijktw X uα π β δΔ = Δ + Δ + + Δ ,    (2) 
where Δ  refers to the first-difference operator and tδ  is a re-normalized vector of time 
dummies (Weiss and Lillard 1978). 
 The first-difference model could exacerbate errors-in-variables problems relative 
to the within model (Griliches and Hausman (1986). If the fatality rate is measured with a 
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classical error, then the first-difference estimate of 1α̂  may be attenuated relative to the 
within estimate. An advantage of the regression specification in (2), which considers 
intertemporal changes in hedonic equilibrium outcomes, arises because we can use so-
called wider (2+ year) differences. If Δ ≥ 2 then measurement error effects are mitigated 
in (2) relative to within-differences regression (Griliches and Hausman 1986). As 
discussed in the data section below, we additionally address the measurement error issue 
in the fatality rate by employing multi-year averages of fatalities. For completeness we 
also note how the first-difference estimates compare to the within estimates. 
 Lillard and Weiss (1979) demonstrated that earnings functions may not only have 
idiosyncratic differences in levels but also have idiosyncratic differences in growth. To 
correct for wages that may not be difference stationary as implied by equation (2) we 
estimate a double differenced version of (2) that is  
  2 2 2 21ln ijkt jkt ijkt t ijktw X uα π β δΔ = Δ + Δ + + Δ ,    (3) 
where 2 1t t−Δ = Δ −Δ , commonly known as the difference-in-difference operator, and tδ  
is a re-normalized vector of time dummies. We also estimate a dynamic version of (2) by 
adding γΔ ln wijkt−1 to the right-hand side and using the first-difference instrumental 
variables estimator recommended in Arellano (1989). As is standard in the dynamic panel 
literature our dynamic estimator uses the two-period lagged level of the dependent 
variable as an identifying instrument for the one-period lagged difference in the 
dependent variable. The lagged dependent variable controls for additional heterogeneity 
and serial correlation plus sluggish adjustment to equilibrium (state dependence). We 
 
 
8
 
therefore compare the estimated short-run effect, 1α̂ , to the estimated long-run effect, 
1ˆ ˆ/(1 )α γ− , and their associated VSLs. 
2.1 Comparison Estimators 
If [ | , ] 0ijk jk ijkE u Xπ = , which is the standard zero conditional mean assumption of 
least squares regression, then OLS estimation of the hedonic equilibrium in (1) using 
pooled cross-section time-series data is consistent. If the zero conditional mean 
assumption holds, which is unlikely to be the case, then the two basic estimators 
frequently employed with panel data, the between-groups estimator and the random-
effects estimator, will yield consistent coefficient estimates. 
The between-groups estimator is a cross-sectional estimator using individuals’ 
time-means of the variables 
 1ln ijk jk ijk ijkw X uα π β δ= + + + ,     (4) 
with 
1
1ln ln
T
ijk ijkt
t
w w
T =
= ∑ and other variables similarly defined. A potential advantage of 
the between-groups estimator is that measurement-error induced attenuation bias in 
estimated coefficients may be reduced because averaging smoothes the data generating 
process. Because measurement error affects estimates of the VSL (Black and Kniesner 
2003; Ashenfelter 2006), the between-groups estimator is likely to provide improved 
estimates of the wage-fatal risk tradeoff over OLS estimates of equation (1). 
 The random-effects model differs from the OLS model in (1) by specifying 
components of the overall error as ijkt i ijktu μ υ= + , where iμ  is person-specific and time-
invariant unobserved heterogeneity, and ijktυ  is an independently and identically 
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distributed random error component. The random-effects estimator is a weighted average 
of the between-groups variation and the within-groups variation. 
 Consistency of the random-effects estimator requires [ | , ] 0i jkt ijktE Xμ π =  and 
[ | , ] 0ijkt jkt ijktE Xυ π = . The first condition implies that the time-invariant unobserved 
heterogeneity is randomly distributed in the population. The implication is that selection 
into possibly risky occupations and industries on the basis of unobserved productivity and 
tastes is purely random across the population of workers. Although both the pooled least 
squares and between-groups estimators remain consistent in the presence of random 
heterogeneity, the random-effects estimator will be more efficient because it accounts for 
person-specific autocorrelation in the wage process. 
 Finally, suppose that selection into a particular industry and occupation is not 
random with respect to time-invariant unobserved productivity and risk preferences. In 
the non-random selection case, estimates of VSL based on the pooled cross-section, 
between-groups, or random-effects estimators will be biased and inconsistent; the IV 
first-differences and double-differences estimators in equations (2) and (3) and the IV 
dynamic first-difference estimator can be consistent despite non-random job switching. 
2.2 Research Objective 
The focal parameter of interest in each of the regression models we estimate is 1α̂
, which is used in constructing estimates of the value of a statistical life. Accounting for 
the fact that fatality risk is per 100,000 workers and that the typical work-year is about 
2000 hours, the estimated value of a statistical life at the mean level of wages is   
  1
ˆ ˆ( ) 2000 100,000wVSL wα
π
∂⎡ ⎤= = × × ×⎢ ⎥∂⎣ ⎦
.   (5) 
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Although the VSL function in (5) can be evaluated at various points in the wage 
distribution, most studies report only the mean effect. To highlight the differences in 
estimates of the VSL with and without controls for unobserved individual differences, we 
follow the standard convention of focusing on VSL  in our estimates presented below. 
Our primary objective is to examine how following systematic econometric practices for 
panel data models reduces the estimated range and pins down VSL. 
3. Data and Sample Descriptions 
 The main body of our data come from the 1993–2001 waves of the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics (PSID), which provides individual-level data on wages, industry and 
occupation, and demographics. The PSID survey has followed a core set of households 
since 1968 plus newly formed households as members of the original core have split off 
into new families. 
3.1 PSID Sample 
 The sample we use consists of male heads of household ages 18–65 who are in 
the random Survey Research Center (SRC) portion of the PSID, and thus excludes the 
oversample of the poor in the Survey of Economic Opportunity (SEO) and the Latino 
sub-sample. The male heads in our regressions (i) worked for hourly or salary pay at 
some point in the previous calendar year, (ii) are not permanently disabled or 
institutionalized, (iii) are not in agriculture or the armed forces, (iv) have a real hourly 
wage greater than $2 per hour and less than $100 per hour, and (v) have no missing data 
on wages, education, region, industry, and occupation. 
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Beginning in 1997 the PSID moved to every other year interviewing. For 
consistent spacing of survey response we use data from the 1993, 1995, 1997, 1999, and 
2001 waves. We do not require individuals to be present for the entire sample period; we 
have an unbalanced panel where we take missing values as random events.6 Our sample 
filters yield 2,106 men and 7,931 person-years. About 40 percent of the men are present 
for all five waves (nine years); another 25 percent are present for at least four waves. 
 The focal variable from the PSID in our models of hedonic labor market 
equilibrium is the hourly wage rate. For workers paid by the hour the survey records the 
gross hourly wage rate. The interviewer asks salaried workers how frequently they are 
paid, such as weekly, bi-weekly, or monthly. The interviewer then norms a salaried 
worker's pay by a fixed number of hours worked depending on the pay period. For 
example, salary divided by 40 is the hourly wage rate constructed for a salaried worker 
paid weekly. We deflate the nominal wage by the personal consumption expenditure 
deflator for 2001 base year. We then take the natural log of the real wage rate to 
minimize the influence of outliers and for ease of comparison with others’ estimates. 
 The demographic controls in the model include years of formal education, a 
quadratic in age, dummy indicators for region of country (northeast, north central, and 
west with south the omitted region), race (white = 1), union status (coverage = 1), marital 
status (married = 1), and one-digit occupation. Table 1 presents summary statistics. 
3.2 Fatality Risk Measures 
 We use the fatality rate for the worker’s two-digit industry by one-digit 
occupation group. We distinguished 720 industry-occupation groups using a breakdown 
                                                 
6 Ziliak and Kniesner (1998) show that if nonrandom attrition is present our differenced data models should 
sweep it out along with the other time-invariant factors. 
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of 72 two-digit SIC code industries and the 10 one-digit occupational groups. After 
constructing codes for two-digit industry by one-digit occupation in the PSID we then 
matched each worker to the relevant industry-occupation fatality risk. We constructed a 
worker fatality risk variable using proprietary U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics data from 
the Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries (CFOI) for 1992–2002.7 
 The CFOI provides the most comprehensive inventory to date of all work-related 
fatalities. The CFOI data come from reports by the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration, workers’ compensation reports, death certificates, and medical examiner 
reports. In each case there is an examination of the records to determine that the fatality 
was in fact a job-related incident.  
 The underlying assumption in our analysis and almost the entire hedonic literature 
more generally is that the subjective risk assessments by workers and firms can be 
captured by objective measures of the risk. Workers and firms use available information 
about the nature of the job and possibly the accident record itself in forming risk beliefs. 
The models do not assume that workers and firms are aware of the published risk 
measures at any point in time. Rather, the objective measures serve as a proxy for the 
subjective beliefs. Previous research reviewed in Viscusi and Aldy (2003) has indicated a 
strong correlation between workers’ subjective risk beliefs and published injury rates. 
Because our fatality risk variable is by industry and by occupation, it will provide a much 
more pertinent measure of the risk associated with a particular job than a more broadly 
based index, such as the industry risk alone, which is the most widely used job risk 
variable. For example, miners and secretaries in the coal mining industry face quite 
                                                 
7 The fatality data can be obtained on CD-ROM via a confidential agreement with the U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics. Our variable construction procedure follows that in Viscusi (2004), which describes the 
properties of the 720 industry-occupation breakdown in greater detail. 
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different risks, so that taking into account the occupation as well as the industry as we do 
here substantially reduces the measurement error in the fatality risk variable. 
 The importance of the industry-occupation structure of our risk variable is 
especially great within the context of a panel data analysis. The previous panel study by 
Brown (1980) used a time-invariant fatality risk measure for 37 relatively high risk 
occupations. By using a fatality risk variable that varies over time and is defined for 720 
industry-occupation groups, we greatly expand the observed variance in workers’ job 
risks across different periods.  
We construct two measures of fatal risk, which differ according to the numerator. 
The first measure simply uses the number of fatalities in each industry-occupation cell. 
The second measure uses a three-year average of fatalities surrounding each PSID survey 
year (1992–1994 for the 1993 wave, 1994–1996 for the 1995 wave, and so on). The 
denominator for each measure used to construct the fatality risk is the number of 
employees for that industry-occupation group in survey year t. Both of our two measures 
of the fatality risk are time-varying because of changes in both the numerator and the 
denominator.8 
We expect there to be less measurement error in the 3-year average fatality rates 
relative to the annual rate because the averaging process will reduce the influence of 
random fluctuations in fatalities as well as mitigate the small sample problems that arise 
from many narrowly defined job categories. We also expect less reporting error in the 
industry information than in the occupation information, so even our annual measure 
should have less measurement error than if the worker’s occupation were the basis for 
                                                 
8 We used the bi-annual employment averages from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population 
Survey, unpublished table, Table 6, Employed Persons by Detailed Industry and Occupation for 1993–
2001.  
 
 
14
 
matching (Mellow and Sider 1983, Black and Kniesner 2003). Table 1 lists the means 
and standard deviations for both fatality risk measures. The sample mean fatality risk for 
the annual measure is 5.7/100,000. As expected, the variation in the annual measure 
exceeds that of the 3-year average. 
 Our research also avoids a problem plaguing past attempts to estimate the wage-
fatal risk tradeoff with panel data. If the fatality rate is an aggregate by industry or 
occupation the within or first-difference transformation leaves little variation in the 
fatality risk measure to identify credibly the fatality parameter. Most of the variation in 
aggregate fatal risk is of the so-called between-groups variety (across occupations or 
industries at a point in time) and not of the within-groups variety (within either 
occupations or industries over time). Although cross-group variation exceeds within-
group variation (Table 2), the within variation in our more disaggregate measures is 
sufficiently large (about 50 percent of the between variation) so that it may be feasible to 
identify the fatal risk parameter and VSL in our panel data models. Finally, we also 
address the issue that cross-group variation in fatality risk may be generated by 
endogenous job switching. 
4. Wage Equation Estimates 
 Although we suppress the coefficients for ease of presentation, each regression 
model we use controls for a quadratic in age, years of schooling, indicators for region, 
marital status, union status, race, one-digit occupation, and year effects. Because of the 
substantial heterogeneity of jobs in different occupations, the regressions include a set of 
one-digit occupation dummies. The equations do not include industry dummy variables 
as well because doing so would introduce substantial multicollinearity with respect to the 
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fatality risk variable, which involves matching workers to fatality risk based on their 
industry and occupation. Reported standard errors are clustered by industry and 
occupation and are also robust to the relevant heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. 
Note that our first-difference regressions automatically net out the influence of industry 
and other job characteristics that do not change over time, and the double-difference 
regressions net out additional trending factors.  
Because our primary focus is on the panel estimates, we do not include variables 
that exhibit little variation across the time periods. Because few workers move out of 
state, we do not include a workers’ compensation variable. Studies that have included 
workers’ compensation generally use a variable based on the state’s maximum benefit 
level, which exhibits little variation for our panel sample.  
4.1 Focal Estimates from Panel Data 
 The baseline first-difference estimates from equation (2) appear in Table 3. The 
results are our basic attempt to address systematically not only latent heterogeneity and 
possibly trended regressors, but also measurement error. Comparing estimates both down 
a column and across a row reveals the effect of measurement error. The results are 
reasonable from both an econometric and economic perspective and provide the 
comparison point for our core research issue, which is how badly VSL can be mis-
represented if certain basic econometric issues are mis-handled. 
 The VSL implied by the coefficient for the annual fatality rate in Table 3 using the 
sample mean wage of $21 is $6.1 million. We emphasize that a novel aspect of our 
research is that it helps clarify the size of possible measurement error effects. If 
measurement error in fatality risk is random it will attenuate coefficient estimates and 
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should be reduced by letting the fatality rate encompass a wider interval. Compared to 
VSL from the more typical annual risk measure, the estimated VSL in Table 3 is about 20 
percent larger when fatality risk is a three-year average. The last two columns of Table 3 
report the results for widest possible differences ( 2001 1993ln lnw w− ) as well as difference-
in-differences from equation (3), which should remove possible spurious estimated 
effects from variables that are not difference stationary. The main message from Table 3 
is that correcting for measurement error enlarges estimated VSL, and that even for the 
relatively basic panel models using differencing, the range for VSL is not large, $5.8–$7.6 
million. 
 An issue seldom addressed in panel wage equations producing VSL is endogeneity 
of the fatality change regressor, which may result from dynamic decisions workers make 
to change jobs (Solon 1986, 1989; Spengler and Schaffner 2006). Some changes in 
fatality risk will occur because of within industry-occupation cell changes and others will 
occur because workers switch industry-occupation cells. Within the context of potentially 
hazardous employment, much of the mobility stems from workers learning about the 
risks on the job and then quitting if the compensating differential is insufficient given that 
information (Viscusi 1979). Within the context of multi-period Bayesian decisions, this 
desire to switch does not require that workers initially underestimated the risk, as 
imprecise risk beliefs can also generate a greater willingness to incur job risks than is 
warranted by the mean risk level. Interestingly, for the job changers in our sample, 55 
percent switch to lower fatality risk jobs and 45 percent switch to higher fatality risk jobs 
so that on balance there is some effort to sort into safer employment. 
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We examine the practical importance for panel based estimation in Table 4, where 
we stratify the data by whether Δπt is due to within or between cell changes, including 
immediately before and after a worker changes cell. The main econometric contribution 
to compensating differentials for fatality risk comes from workers who generate 
differences in risk over time by switching industry-occupation cells. The difference in 
estimated VSL in Table 4 comes from the fact that 2
tπ
σ is at least 6 times larger for 
switchers (see Table 2). There is too little within-cells variation to reveal much of a 
compensating differential. More important, because so much of the variation producing 
the wage differential in Table 3 comes from job changers, and the variation for switchers 
may be related to wages, it is important to treat Δπ  as endogenous. 
 The estimated range for VSL narrows even further when we allow for endogeneity 
and instrument the change in fatality risk. The instrumental variables regressions in Table 
5 control for both classical measurement errors and endogeneity. We limit the focus to 
the annual fatality rate so as to have enough lagged fatality and fatality differences as 
instruments.9 The main result is a very narrow range of estimated VSL, $5.6–$5.7 million 
when we instrument the annual change in fatality risk. 
Table 6 presents our final focal panel results from dynamic first-difference 
regressions. The short-run effects from the dynamic model appear in column 1 and the 
long-run (steady state) estimates appear in column 2. Note that our first-differences 
estimator focuses on changes in wages in response to changes in risk. The mechanism by 
which the changes will become reflected in the labor market hinges on how shifts in the 
                                                 
9 The instrument set we use is standard and well-established in the econometric literature on dynamic panel 
models and will not be discussed further here. The interested reader should consult Arellano (1989) for 
elaboration. 
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risk level will affect the tangencies of the constant expected utility loci with the market 
offer curve. To the extent that the updating of risk beliefs occurs gradually over time, 
which is not unreasonable because even release of the government risk data is not 
contemporaneous, one would expect the long-run effects on wages of changes in job risk 
to exceed the short-run effects. Limitations on mobility will reinforce a lagged influence 
(state dependence). As one would then expect, the steady state estimates of VSL after the 
estimated three-year adjustment period in the results in Table 6 are larger than the short-
run estimates. The difference between the short-run and long-run VSL is about $7–8 
million versus $10–11 million. Again, the range of VSL estimates is not wide when panel 
data are used with state-of-the-art estimators appropriate for the issues of endogeneity, 
measurement error, latent heterogeneity and possible state dependence. 
4.2 Comparison Results From Cross-Section Estimators 
 Table 7 presents the comparison models, which flesh out the most salient 
econometric issues when compared to the focal results from Tables 3–6 just presented. 
 One problematic result in the literature is the regularly occurring large value for 
VSL when the PSID is used as a cross-section (Viscusi and Aldy 2003). Notice that the 
cross-section estimators in columns 1 and 2 produce large implied VSLs, which also have 
a much numerically larger range than the panel estimates, $16–22 million. 
 In contrast, column 3 of Table 7 reports estimates from the panel random-effects 
estimator. Recall that the random-effects estimator accounts for unobserved 
heterogeneity, which is assumed to be uncorrelated with observed covariates. It is fairly 
common in labor-market research to reject the assumption of no correlation between 
unobserved heterogeneity and observed covariates; we find a similar rejection here. This 
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implies that the simple fixed effects within estimator in the last column is preferred over 
the simple random effects estimator, with an estimated VSL of about $5.5 million. 
Allowing for the possibility of unobserved productivity and preferences for risk, even if it 
is improperly assumed to be randomly distributed in the population, reduces the 
estimated VSL by up to 75 percent relative to a model that ignores latent heterogeneity 
(the pooled least squares estimates). The difference in estimated VSL with versus without 
latent individual heterogeneity in the model is consistent with the theoretical prediction in 
Shogren and Stamland (2002) that failure to control for unobserved skill results in a 
potentially substantial upward bias in the estimated VSL. Taking into account the 
influence of individual heterogeneity implies that, on balance, unobservable person-
specific differences in safety-related productivity and risk preferences are a more 
powerful influence than unobservable productivity generally, which Hwang, Reed, and 
Hubbard (1992) hypothesize to have the opposite effect. 
5. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
 Obtaining reliable estimates of compensating differential equations has long been 
challenging because of the central roles of individual heterogeneity and state dependence 
in affecting both the market offer curve and individual preferences. The often conflicting 
influence of different unobservable factors has led to competing theories with predictions 
of different direction. The first-difference estimation results reported here use more 
refined fatality risk measures than employed in earlier studies, making it possible to 
control for measurement errors and workplace safety endogeneity when examining the 
wage-fatality risk tradeoff. Comparison of the various first-difference results with various 
cross-section estimates implies that controlling for latent worker-specific heterogeneity 
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reduces the estimated VSL by up to 75 percent and narrows greatly the VSL range to 
about $5.5–$7.5 million.  
 The wide variation of VSL estimates in the literature also has generated concern 
that underlying econometric problems may jeopardize the validity of those estimates. The 
range for VSL in the existing literature is extremely wide, from $0.5 million to $21 
million. Previous studies using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics have often yielded 
extremely high VSL estimates around $20 million. Earlier research did not control for the 
host of econometric problems we address here. The econometrically most general first-
difference estimates we report range from $5.5 million to $7.5 million.  
Narrowing VSL as we do here has substantial benefits for policy evaluation. In its 
Budget Circular A4 (Sept. 17, 2003), the U.S. Office of Management and Budget requires 
that agencies indicate the range of uncertainty around key parameter values used in 
benefit-cost assessments. Attempting to bound the VSL based on a meta analysis 
produces a wide range of estimates for $0.5 to $21 million. Moreover, there is always the 
issue of what studies should be included in the meta analysis given the differences in data 
sets, specifications, and study quality. As a consequence of the associated 
indeterminacies, agencies often have failed to provide any boundaries at all to the key 
VSL parameter in their benefit assessments. 
The advantage of using our VSL range in policy assessments can be illustrated 
using Figure 1. Using VSL estimates from the previous literature, policies with a cost per 
life saved of $500,000 or less are desirable, those with a cost per life saved over $21 
million fail a benefit-cost test, and the desirability of policies in the intermediate range is 
unclear. Based on our results, denoted by KVWZ, policies with a cost per life saved at or 
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below $5.5 million are in the acceptable range, those with a cost per life saved above $7.5 
million fail a benefit-cost test, and policies in the intermediate range have unclear 
economic desirability. For a hypothetical distribution of policies indicated by the bell 
shaped curve in Figure 1 with a mean VSL of $10 million, it is clear that the range of 
indeterminacy is greatly reduced by application of our VSL range. 
The implications of this hypothetical example are also borne out for the 
distribution of U.S. health and safety regulations. Using the widely cited estimates from 
the U.S. Office of Management and Budget cited by Breyer (1993), among others, and 
updating the values to $2001, illustrates the tremendous reduction of policy uncertainty 
achievable by application of our estimates. Applying the meta analysis VSL range, 10 
policies pass a benefit-cost test, 20 fail a benefit-cost test, and 23 are in the indeterminate 
zone. Using our estimated VSL range, the distributions becomes 27 policies that clearly 
pass a benefit-cost test, 25 that fail a benefit-cost test, with only 1 policy in the 
indeterminate range. Our narrowing of the acceptable cost-per-life-saved range greatly 
reduces the range of indeterminacy and is of substantial practical consequence given the 
actual distribution of regulatory policy performance.  
From a more conceptual standpoint, our research has resolved the econometric 
issues giving rise to the very high/low levels and wide ranges of published VSL estimates. 
The disparate results in previous studies may reflect the influence of omitted 
unobservable effects, among other repairable econometric specification errors. Failure to 
address the underlying econometric issues may have produced continuing controversy in 
the economics literature over the hedonic methodology and unduly muddled the policy 
debate over the use of VSL estimates in benefit calculations for government policies.
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Table 1:  Selected Summary Statistics 
  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Real Hourly Wage 21.058 13.352 
Log Real Hourly Wage 2.881 0.570 
Age 40.895 8.450 
Marital Status (1=Married) 0.820 0.384 
Race (1=White) 0.764 0.425 
Union (1=member) 0.230 0.421 
Years of Schooling 13.585 2.216 
Live in Northeast 0.177 0.382 
Live in Northcentral 0.288 0.453 
Live in South 0.372 0.483 
Live in West 0.163 0.370 
   
One-Digit Industry Groups:   
Mining 0.008 0.087 
Construction 0.106 0.308 
Manufacturing 0.259 0.438 
Transportation and Public Utilities 0.109 0.311 
Wholesale and Retail Trade 0.130 0.337 
Fire, Insurance, and Real Estate 0.045 0.208 
Business and Repair Services 0.066 0.248 
Personal Services 0.009 0.097 
Entertainment and Professional Services 0.169 0.375 
Public Administration 0.098 0.297 
   
One-Digit Occupation Groups:   
Executive and Managerial 0.187 0.390 
Professional 0.162 0.368 
Technicians 0.058 0.234 
Sales 0.032 0.177 
Administrative Support 0.066 0.248 
Services 0.086 0.280 
Precision Production Crafts 0.207 0.405 
Machine Operators 0.078 0.268 
Transportation 0.080 0.272 
Handlers and Labors 0.045 0.208 
   
Annual Fatality Rate (per 100,000) 5.704 8.973 
3-Year Fatality Rate (per 100,000) 5.565 8.414 
   
Number of Men = 2,106   
Number of Person Years = 7,931     
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Table 2:  Between and Within Group Variation for Industry by 
Occupation Fatality Rates 
    
 
Overall 
Variance 
Between 
Group 
Variance 
Within 
Group 
Variance 
Annual Fatality Rate 
(per 100,000) 80.519 52.484 28.035 
3-Year Fatality Rate 
(per 100,000) 70.801 50.298 20.503 
    
    
Never Change Industry-Occupation    
Annual Fatality Rate 
(per 100,000) 75.696 70.032 5.664 
3-Year Fatality Rate 
(per 100,000) 71.667 69.452 2.215 
    
Ever Change Industry-Occupation    
Annual Fatality Rate 
(per 100,000) 82.574 45.031 37.543 
3-Year Fatality Rate 
(per 100,000) 70.439 42.164 28.275 
    
Only When Change Industry-Occupation    
Annual Fatality Rate 
(per 100,000) 88.309 53.274 35.035 
3-Year Fatality Rate 
(per 100,000) 71.669 49.001 22.668 
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Table 3: First-Difference Estimates of Wage-Fatal Risk Tradeoff 
  
Original Static 
First Difference 
Estimates 
First-Difference 
Estimator for 
2001minus1993  
Difference in 
Differences 
Estimator 
       
Annual Fatality Rate x 1,000  1.4425 1.6646 1.5553 
  (0.4175) (1.3584) (0.5091) 
     
Implied VSL ($Millions)  6.1 7.0 6.6  
     
3-Year Fatality Rate x 1,000  1.7531 1.3834 1.7979 
  (0.5276) (1.4344) (0.6142) 
     
Implied VSL ($Millions)  7.4 5.8 7.6 
     
Number of Observations  5242 1255 
  
3373 
Notes:  Standard errors are recorded in parentheses. Standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and within industry-by-occupation autocorrelation. Each model controls for a 
quadratic in age, years of schooling, indicators for region, marital status, union status, race, one-
digit occupation, and year effects. To construct the VSL using equation (5) the coefficients in the 
table are divided by 1,000. 
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Table 4: Estimates of Wage-Fatal Risk Tradeoff by Job Change Status 
  Static First-Difference 
First-Difference 
Estimator for 2001 
minus 1993  
Never Change Industry-Occupation   
Annual Fatality Rate x 1,000 0.3306 -0.1188 
 (1.2132) (2.8783) 
   
Implied VSL ($Millions) 1.4 −0.5 
  
3-Year Fatality Rate x 1,000 -0.5653 2.1041 
 (2.2522) (3.9626) 
   
Implied VSL ($Millions) −2.4 8.9 
   
Number of Person-Years 1493 330 
Ever Change Industry-Occupation   
Annual Fatality Rate x 1,000 1.5483 1.9423 
 (0.4473) (1.4353) 
   
Implied VSL ($Millions) 6.5 8.2 
   
3-Year Fatality Rate x 1,000 1.8660 1.4322 
 (0.5352) (1.5141) 
   
Implied VSL ($Millions) 7.9 6.0 
   
Number of Person-Years 3749 925 
Only When Change Industry-Occupation  
Annual Fatality Rate x 1,000 1.7252 1.7662 
 (0.4996) (1.4580) 
   
Implied VSL ($Millions) 7.3 7.4 
   
3-Year Fatality Rate x 1,000 2.0045 1.3121 
 (0.5604) (1.5303) 
   
Implied VSL ($Millions) 8.4 5.5 
   
Number of Person-Years 1033 745 
Notes:  Standard errors are recorded in parentheses. Standard errors for the pooled times series 
cross-section estimator and the first difference estimator are robust to heteroskedasticity and 
within industry-by-occupation autocorrelation. Each model controls for a quadratic in age, years 
of schooling, indicators for region, marital status, union status, race, one-digit occupation, and 
year effects. To construct the VSL using equation (5) the coefficients in the table are divided by 
1,000. 
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Table 5: Instrumental Variables Estimates of Wage-Fatal Risk Tradeoff 
 
First-Difference IV 
Estimator, t−1 and t−3  
Fatality as Instruments 
First-Difference IV 
Estimator, Lag 
Differenced Fatality as 
Instrument 
   
Annual Fatality Rate x 1,000 1.3377 1.3417 
 (0.6676) (0.6677) 
   
Implied VSL ($Millions) 5.6 5.7 
   
   
First Stage Results   
   
t−1 fatality rate 0.6528  
(0.0114)  
  
t−3 fatality rate −0.6512  
 (0.0113)  
   
(t−1 rate) − (t−3 rate)  0.6520 
  (0.0103) 
   
R2 0.54 0.54 
  
  
Number of Observations 5242 5242 
Notes:  Standard errors are recorded in parentheses. Standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and within industry-by-occupation autocorrelation. Each model controls 
for a quadratic in age, years of schooling, indicators for region, marital status, union status, 
race, one-digit occupation, and year effects. First stage regressions include all exogenous 
explanatory variables in addition to the noted instruments. To construct the VSL using 
equation (5) the coefficients in the table are divided by 1,000. 
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Table 6: Dynamic First Difference Estimates of Wage-Fatal Risk Tradeoff 
 
Dynamic First-Difference 
Estimates   
 with lag wage instrumented   
   
      
      
 
Short-Run 
Effect Long-Run Effect    
      
Annual Fatality Rate x 1,000 1.7583  2.4825     
 (0.5390) [0.0024]    
      
Implied VSL ($Millions) 7.4 10.5    
      
3-Year Fatality Rate x 1,000 1.8154  2.5623     
 (0.6629) [0.0088]    
      
Implied VSL ($Millions) 7.6  10.8    
      
Number of Observations 3373    
Notes:  Standard errors are recorded in parentheses and p-values of the null hypothesis that the long-run 
effect is zero are recorded in square brackets. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and within 
industry-by-occupation autocorrelation. Models control for a quadratic in age, years of schooling, indicators 
for region, marital status, union status, race, one-digit occupation, and year effects. One and two year lags of 
the independent variables, except for the fatality rates, are included as instruments for the lag wage. To 
construct the VSL using equation (5) the coefficients in the table are divided by 1,000. 
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Table 7:  Cross Section and Panel Data Estimates of Wage-Fatal Risk Tradeoff 
  
Pooled Cross 
Section Time 
Series 
Estimator 
Between-
Group 
Estimator 
Random-
Effects 
Estimator 
Fixed-Effects 
Estimator 
     
Annual Fatality Rate x 1,000 3.8702  5.2443  1.7401  1.2498  
 (0.9972) (1.5944) (0.5185) (0.5382) 
     
Implied VSL ($Millions) 16.3 22.1 7.3 5.3 
     
3-Year Fatality Rate x 1,000 4.3338  5.0506  2.0445  1.3352  
 (1.0316) (1.5811) (0.6074) (0.6452) 
     
Implied VSL ($Millions) 18.3 21.3 8.6 5.6 
     
Number of Observations 7928 2106 7928 7737 
Notes:  Standard errors are recorded in parentheses. Standard errors for the pooled times series 
cross-section estimator and the first difference estimator are robust to heteroskedasticity and within 
industry-by-occupation autocorrelation. Each model controls for a quadratic in age, years of 
schooling, indicators for region, marital status, union status, race, one-digit occupation, and year 
effects. To construct the VSL using equation (5) the coefficients in the table are divided by 1,000. 
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Figure 1: VSL Range and Program Evaluation 
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